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Abstract
This paper provides further evidence on the recent increase in international consumption risk sharing.
We show that this increase is more pronounced among EU and EMU countries than among non-E(M)U
industrialised countries. We also show that the patterns of international but intra-European risk sharing
have started to diverge from what is found at the level of the OECD as a whole. During the 1990s,
capital income flows have started to play a relatively more important role between European countries,
whereas the increase in international risk sharing among the OECD as a whole is almost exclusively
driven by better consumption smoothing through the accumulation or decumulation of foreign assets.
This EMU effect on the pattern of risk sharing survives once we control for differences in international
portfolio holdings: while we find that countries with higher equity cross-holdings also tend to share
more risk through capital income flows there remains an independent EMU-effect on the way how risk
is shared. While it is too early to evaluate these findings conclusively, we discuss some possible
interpretations and their implications for economic policy.
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Abstract
This paper provides further evidence on the recent increase in international
consumption risk sharing. We show that this increase is more pronounced
among EU and EMU countries than among non-E(M)U industrialised coun-
tries. We also show that the patterns of international but intra-European risk
sharing have started to diverge from what is found at the level of the OECD
as a whole. During the 1990s, capital income ows have started to play a
relatively more important role between European countries, whereas the in-
crease in international risk sharing among the OECD as a whole is almost
exclusively driven by better consumption smoothing through the accumula-
tion or decumulation of foreign assets. This EMU e¤ect on the pattern of
risk sharing survives once we control for di¤erences in international portfolio
holdings: while we nd that countries with higher equity cross-holdings also
tend to share more risk through capital income ows there remains an inde-
pendent EMU-e¤ect on the way how risk is shared. While it is too early to
evaluate these ndings conclusively, we discuss some possible interpretations
and their implications for economic policy.
Keywords: Consumption Risk Sharing, Capital ows, Home Bias, EMU,
Financial integration
JEL classication: C23, E21, F36
1 Introduction
The last decade has seen a virtual explosion of international cross-holdings of
nancial assets (see e.g. Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2003, 2005)). It seems more
than plausible that the gradual removal of portfolio home bias should lead to
more e¢ cient international risk sharing. From a macroeconomic perspective,
a natural way to assess the welfare implications of better international port-
folio diversication is to look at consumption-based measures of risk sharing.
However, to date very few papers have been able to document that consump-
tion risk sharing has actually improved along with the removal of portfolio
home bias.
In this chapter, we rst review this recent evidence that also includes some
of our own work. We discuss why conventional consumption-based measures
of risk sharing have a hard time picking up the increase in international risk
sharing and we build on a novel approach suggested in Artis and Ho¤mann
(2006) to corroborate that international consumption risk sharing has indeed
increased. This approach uses the information implicit in the levels of rela-
tive consumption and output. The focus on relative levels rather than on
rst di¤erences of the data as in virtually all of the earlier literature allows
us to document longer-term trends in consumption risk sharing that earlier
specications have not been able to pick up. We nd that the increase in in-
ternational risk sharing is economically signicant: If regional evidence from
a well-integrated economy such as the United States is taken as the bench-
mark, we nd that between a third to one half of the lack of international
risk sharing has vanished within a single decade.
The chapter rst summarizes some of our previous analyses of portfo-
lio holdings and capital income ows and risk sharing (Artis and Ho¤mann
(2006, 2004)). It is also closely related to Sorensen, Wu, Yosha and Zu
(2006).1 To our knowledge, these are so far the only papers to provide con-
clusive evidence that consumption risk sharing has indeed increased during
the 1990s. In particular, SWYZ is the rst to show that this increase in risk
sharing is related to increased international portfolio diversication. Artis
and Ho¤mann (2006), establishes a similar result, but in contrast to SWYZ,
ours is based on international cross-holdings of assets; we nd that countries
with higher cumulated asset trade also share more risk.
Besides a synthesis of recent ndings that we and others have obtained,
we o¤er some important new results: rst, we analyse the increase in in-
ternational risk sharing with special reference to the experience of current
EMU member countries. Secondly, we o¤er a detailed analysis of the chan-
1We refer to this paper via the acronym SWYZ .
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nels through which improvements in international consumption risk sharing
have come about. We conrm that consumption risk sharing has improved
equally in all industrialised countries. But the level of consumption risk
sharing reached among E(M)U countries is higher and possibly most in-
terestingly recent improvements have occurred through di¤erent channels:
among EU countries international capital income ows have become more
important as a way to shield consumption from uctuations in relative out-
puts, whereas in our entire panel of 23 industrialised countries, the ex-post
cumulation and decumulation of foreign assets remains the main channel of
international risk sharing.
These ndings are robust once we control for other determinants of the
patterns of international risk sharing and in particular so for the characteris-
tics of countriesasset portfolios. We corroborate the nding that countries
with lower home bias achieve more risk sharing low risk sharing and portfo-
lio home bias are twin puzzles separated at birth. We add to this the nding
that countries with higher equity shares in their international portfolios share
a larger portion of risk through capital income ows.
Our results suggest that by the end of our sample period that ranges
from 1980-2004, the possibly most important di¤erence between E(M)U and
other industrialised countries is that, in the late 1990s, capital income ows
have taken over as the main driver of improvements in intra-European risk
sharing. By the year 2004, one third of the risk sharing achieved through
international nancial markets was achieved through capital income ows.
Outside Europe, this channel still virtually plays no role for risk sharing.
While the sheer growth in intra-European risk sharing over the 90s is already
impressive, the patterns that emerge increasingly resemble those observed
within national boundaries. EMU-membership may matter for how much
risk a country shares, but increasingly it also matters for how it shares it.
While it is too early to evaluate these trends in a conclusive manner, we
discuss the possibility that the creation of EMU itself and the associated
elimination of exchange rate variability is responsible for the emergence of
this pattern.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in the next section
we review the theoretical rationale behind consumption-based measures of
risk sharing. Section three then documents that simple risk sharing mea-
sures do not seem to have increased in the recent period of globalization
and outlines our alternative approach that is based on relative levels of con-
sumption, income and output. In section four we then document patterns of
international risk sharing for di¤erent country groupings, using an adaptation
of the variance decomposition suggested by Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha
(1996). Finally, we also relate these patterns to the structure of international
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portfolio holdings. Section ve discusses and concludes.
2 Measuring consumption risk sharing
All consumption-based measures of risk sharing that we consider in this chap-
ter are motivated by a benchmark model with complete markets. In the sim-
plest complete markets model, marginal utility growth in country or region
k equals the growth in the shadow price of consumption and is therefore
equalized across countries:
u0k(C
k
t+1)
u0k(C
k
t )
=
t+1
t
(1)
where u0(:) is the period utility function and Ckt measures consumption in
country k and t is the shadow price of consumption. There are two related
readings of this fundamental equation that have both found their reections
in the empirical literature. The rst is that marginal utility growth should
be perfectly correlated across countries. One branch of the literature there-
fore looks at consumption correlations. This line of research has encountered
the now famous consumption correlation puzzle (Backus, Kehoe, Kydland
(1992)) that consists in the stylized fact that international consumption cor-
relations are lower than the corresponding output correlations. Stockman
and Tesar (1995) have argued that consumption is likely to be driven by
preference shocks and subject to considerable measurement error so that low
empirical consumption correlations could in principle arise even in complete
markets. While this puzzle is an important stylized fact that calls for a theo-
retical explanation, the argument by Stockman and Tesar demonstrates that
it is di¢ cult to directly interpret consumption correlations as measures of
risk sharing: the very fact that consumption correlations (as a measure of
relative marginal utility) are less correlated than the underlying risks (i.e.
output) would suggest that people use nancial markets to destabilize their
relative marginal utilities.
Our main focus in this chapter will therefore be on an alternative read-
ing of equation (1) that has equally made a profound impact on the risk
sharing literature: marginal utility growth in country k should be indepen-
dent of country-specic risk-variables. Since growth in the shadow price is
common to all countries, the di¤erence between marginal utility growth in
two countries should be statistically independent of the relative endowment
variables.
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In order to obtain an estimable equation, specic assumptions on the form
of the utility function are typically made. Under log-utility, the optimality
condition can therefore be written
E

ckt  ct jXkt

= 0
where X is a vector of idiosyncratic risk factors for country k , such as
relative output growth, and the asterisked variable refers to a world average.
Therefore, under full insurance, the regression
ckt  ct = b0Xkt + "t
should yield a coe¢ cient of zero.2 Specically, many researchers, including
Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha, as well as Hess and Shin (1998) and Crucini
(1999) have used regressions of the form
ckt  ct = u

ykt  y

+ "t (2)
where yk is the logarithm of output in country k and the asterisk denotes the
world average. We call this equation the basic risk sharing regression (RSR).
Clearly, in a model with complete markets (and against the backdrop of the
qualications given above) the coe¢ cient estimate of u should be zero or
close to zero. The acknowledgement that real world nancial markets are
likely to be incomplete in many ways has led researchers to adopt a more
pragmatic approach in applied work. Rather than testing the null of complete
markets, i.e. u = 0, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) as well as
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) have argued very convincingly that the coe¢ cient
u may be of interest in itself and that it should be interpreted as a measure
of the deviation from the complete markets outcome. Applying this insight
to US state level data, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha nd that roughly a
quarter of idiosyncratic output uctuations remain uninsured. Conversely,
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) show that among OECD countries, more than 70
percent of idiosyncratic uctuations remain uninsured. Hence, there is a lack
of international consumption risk sharing when risk sharing within countries
is taken as the benchmark.
In the next section, we examine this basic risk sharing regression in our
international data set. In particular, we will focus on the way in which
estimates of u have changed during the recent globalization period.
2Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994) were the rst authors to
investigate regressions of this type in household-level data.
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3 The increase in international risk sharing
3.1 Data
Our data are from the Penn World Table, release 6.2 (PWT 6.2.) by Heston,
Summers and Aten (2006) and range from 1960 to 2006. All data are in
constant (1996) international prices. The countries included in our estimation
are:
1. Canada, 2. the United States, 3. Japan, 4. Austria, 5. Belgium,
6. Denmark , 7. Finland, 8. France, 9. Germany (West), 10. Greece, 11.
Iceland, 12. Ireland, 13. Italy, 14. Luxemburg, 15. Netherlands, 16. Norway,
17. Portugal, 18. Spain, 19. Sweden, 20. Switzerland, 21. United Kingdom,
22. Australia, 23. New Zealand.
Most of these countries are OECD countries and we will refer to them
under this label. Since we are particularly interested in the role that Eu-
ropean integration and monetary integration in particular may have played
in allowing countries to share risk more e¢ ciently, we also report results
for EU and EMU member countries. Specically, we consider the group of
15 EU countries as of 1996 (EU15): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom and the group of the twelve
current (as of June 2006) EMU members (EMU12).
We express all data in per capita terms. Rest of the World (RoW) ag-
gregates are the OECD-wide average per capita values. Population data are
also from the PWT.
We will report results for two subperiods. The rst subperiod ranges
from 1980-1990 and covers a decade in which the momentum of formal liber-
alization of international capital markets increased apace. The second period
covers the period 1990-2004. Considering this period should provide insights
into the e¤ects of the dramatic increase in net international asset positions
that took place in particular in the 1990s (compare e.g. the data in Lane
(2000) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001,2006)). We refer to this latter part
of our sample as the globalization period.
3.2 The impact of globalization on consumption-based
risk sharing measures.
Clearly, getting right the link between nancial globalization that undoubt-
edly is happening and consumption-based measures of risk sharing is of the
utmost importance if such measures are to inform policy discussions. Equally
clearly, there is also a challenge from a theoretical perspective: the very rai-
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son dêtre of nancial markets is the allocation of consumption risk and in
virtually all modern macroeconomic models the welfare gains from nancial
globalization will be a function of the variability of consumption.
But while basic risk sharing regressions have proven enormously useful in
documenting a lack of risk sharing among countries, they have been much less
successful in picking up the e¤ects of nancial globalization. Table 1 presents
basic risk sharing regressions for the two subperiods 1980-1990 and 1990-
2004. We report results from two di¤erent estimation procedures: the rst is
simply panel OLS, in the second we account for potential heteroskedasticity
by rst running the risk sharing regression country by country. We then
use the country-specic residual variance to weight the data for the second-
stage regression. Only for the OECD do the regressions suggest a signicant
increase in risk sharing. This is clearly not the case for the two groups of
European countries, the EU15 and EMU12. Rather to the contrary; here the
estimates generally would even seem to suggest a decrease in risk sharing,
even though the di¤erence between subperiods does not generally appear
signicant.
One reason why the basic risk sharing regression may often fail to pick
up the e¤ects of nancial globalization is that the risk sharing coe¢ cient u
will be a function not only of the degree of international diversication but
also of the cross-sectional variability of output growth rates, their degree of
synchronization and their relative persistence, i.e. of the underlying risks.
In a world with complete markets, none of these parameters should matter:
if u = 0, i.e. of the correlation between relative output and consumption
growth is zero, then no matter what the stochastic properties of relative
output growth is, consumption will not react. But if there is some but not
complete risk sharing, then the coe¢ cient of the basic risk sharing regression
can also be a function of the structure of business cycles, i.e. of the correlation
structure of yk and y.
For example, Crucini (1999) considers a model in which countries diversify
their risk ex ante through trade in a set of Shiller Securities, i.e. assets that
pay a countrys per capita output as a dividend (see Shiller (1993)). Each
country allocates its wealth between two assets: a world mutual fund of
Shiller securities that pays world per capita output as its dividend and a
claim to home output. In this model, income (GNP) growth in country k is
a portfolio-weighted average of output growth rates at home and in the rest
of the world,
inckt = (1  )ykt + yt
where inck denotes income growth and  is the share of wealth invested
in the world mutual fund. In this toy model,  can be interpreted as the
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degree of diversication or of risk sharing and 1    is a measure of the
home bias. As we discuss in Artis and Ho¤mann (2004), in this model, the
basic risk sharing regression will only reveal the degree of diversication, i.e
will uncover , if the representative consumer actually consumes her entire
income, i.e. if ck = inck. Then, it must also be that c = inc = y
so that the above reduces to:
ckt  ct = (1  )

ykt  yt

But the basic risk sharing regression (as equation (2)) will not generally cor-
rectly recover the lack of diversication. If  is not equal to unity, optimizing
consumers will generally seek to smooth their consumption further, e.g. by
seeking to consume what is the permanent component of their income. Then,
ck = inckP , where the superscript denotes the permanent component.
It is well-known that in a permanent income setting the response of con-
sumption to current income critically depends on the degree of persistence
of the underlying shocks. For example, if permanent output shocks trigger a
positively serially correlated output response, then current consumption will
be relatively more volatile than current income: since high current income
forebodes higher income tomorrow and since the shock is permanent it is op-
timal to destabilize consumption; current consumption will be more volatile
than current income, so that
ckt  ct = (1 + )(1  )

ykt  yt

and u = (1 + )(1   ) with  > 0  the coe¢ cient of the basic risk
sharing regression will be biased upwards. Conversely, if shocks to income
are temporary, then current income will be more volatile than consumption,
so that  < 0, which biases u downward. In this case, the basic risk sharing
regression would signal too much risk sharing.
In some of our earlier work (Artis and Ho¤mann (2004)) we argue that
the basic risk sharing regression is still likely to be a very useful tool in the
sense that the biases in u seem relatively limited in any given subperiod that
a researcher may wish to consider. In particular, di¤erences in  between say
countries and regions can certainly not explain away the lack of international
risk sharing. Still, gradual but secular changes in the structure of interna-
tional business cycles, e.g. their variability and degree of synchronization
can over time a¤ect  and may therefore render long-range comparisons of
estimates of u invalid.
In particular over the last decade, nancial globalization has led to ever
larger cross-holdings of assets across countries; the home bias is eventually
vanishing. In the toy model above, this is likely to have increased . But
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at the same time, the last two decades have also seen huge changes in the
structure of international business cycles. Stock and Watson (2005) have ar-
gued very forcefully that international business cycles have become much less
volatile. Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003, 2004) show that they have also
become more synchronized once one conditions on the presence of large neg-
ative shocks (such as the rst and second oil shocks) that tend to be common
across countries. As we argue in Artis and Ho¤mann (2004), the presence
of large common shocks is likely to increase consumption correlations given
the degree of international diversication. Since the beginning of the 1980s
has seen large common negative shocks that we have not experienced in the
1990s, consumption correlations today may appear no higher than they were
in the 1980s, even though globalization is likely to have a¤ected them ceteris
paribus. In a similar mould, Imbs (2006) provides cross-sectional evidence
that countries with higher bilateral trade linkages have higher consumption
correlations. Still, he nds the quantity puzzle (i.e. the fact that consump-
tion correlations are lower than output correlations) persists because output
correlations also increase with trade intensity. It is beyond the scope of this
chapter to analyse these mechanisms in detail. What we wish to convey here
is that the basic risk sharing regression may fail to pick up secular changes
in risk sharing because it is highly susceptible to changes in the stochastic
environment at the business cycle frequency. Here we illustrate this point
by dissecting the basic risk sharing regression (2) into a sequence of cross-
sectional regressions at each point during the sample period, i.e. we run
ckt  ct = u(t)

ykt  yt

+ "kt
for t = 1980:::2004.3
The rst column of gure (1) plots the sequence fu(t)gt=1980:::2000 for the
three groups: OECD, EU and EMU countries. As is apparent, the estimates
of u(t) are extremely volatile for all three country groups.
In spite of the huge volatility in the estimates, there seems to be an
upward trend in risk sharing which can be teased out from the data, once we
smooth the sequence of coe¢ cients through HP-ltering.4 These HP-trends
are given by the smooth lines in the graphs. Indeed, it seems that there
is a gradual increase in risk sharing. It is noteworthy, however, that for
the OECD23 this trend accelerates in the rst half of the 1990s but attens
out thereafter. For the other two groups there is also a trend towards more
3Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) demonstrate that the panel OLS-coe¢ cient u
is a weighted time-average of the cross-sectional coe¢ cients u(t).
4Our results reported here are based on a smoothness parameter of 100, but the results
are not sensitive to this choice.
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risk sharing, but in particular for EMU countries most of the increase comes
about in the rst half of the 1980s, which seems odd if we take into account
that nancial integration even among EU and EMU countries is likely to
have picked up speed only in the second half of the 1980s.
Though the ndings here provide rst evidence that risk sharing may in-
deed have increased, they underpin our earlier point that estimates of the
basic risk sharing regression have a hard time uncovering the e¤ect of iden-
tifying this increase head on. One possible reason that we have discussed is
that these estimates are likely to be sensitive to the exact nature of shocks
and in particular to changes in the stochastic environment that a¤ect the
correlation between consumption and output at business cycle frequencies.
As a result, repeated cross-sectional estimates of the risk sharing coe¢ cient
u(t) appear extremely volatile and even though these estimates do display
a downward trend, they easily vary more over the business cylce than does
the trend in u(t) over the entire sample period.
A plausibly more direct approach that builds on our analysis in Artis and
Ho¤mann (2006) and that we also advocate here is to emphasize the low-
frequency comovement of consumption and output by formulating the risk
sharing regression in terms of relative levels rather than in relative di¤erences.
Hence, the regressions we will use in the remainder of this paper are of the
form
ckt   ct = LRu

ykt   yt

+ vkt + constant (3)
Here, the superscript LRis meant to emphasize that we think of this level
risk sharing regression as picking up longer-term risk sharing.
The estimation of this level risk sharing regression poses some interesting
econometric issues, since relative consumption and output levels could be
integrated variables. We discuss these issues in some more detail in the next
section. For now, we provide a rst demonstration of the potential usefulness
of our approach by, again, dissecting the above regression into a sequence
of cross-sectional regressions along the lines of the equation above. The
second column of gure (1) plots the sequences of fLRu (t)g thus obtained.
For comparison, the smooth lines in the individual graphs reproduce the
HP-trend of the sequence of basic risk sharing regressions. The rst thing
that is noteworthy is that for all three groups of countries, the long-run
risk sharing coe¢ cient displays a clear downward tendency that is clearly
discernible without having to resort to ltering techniques. As we would
expect, this trend towards more risk sharing is somewhat more pronounced
in the EU and EMU countries but follows the same overall pattern for all
three country groups in that it kicks in in the second half of the 1980s to
pick up speed throughout the 1990s.
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4 Patterns of international risk sharing
We now turn to estimating the level risk sharing regressions as a panel rela-
tion. At the same time, we attempt to identify the channels through which
the apparent increase in international risk sharing has come about. In so do-
ing, we adapt the variance decomposition proposed by Asdrubali, Sorensen
and Yosha (1996) to our level regressions here. This will allow us to identify
two fundamental channels through which risk sharing can occur and which
are also embodied in the simple theoretical framework that we have discussed
in the previous section. The rst is the capital income ow channel; countries
that have diversied by swapping assets ex ante will derive capital income
ows from these assets. This will allow them to decouple their output from
their income, their GDP from their GNP. We refer to this channel as the cap-
ital income ow or income smoothing channel. The second channel pertains
to further smoothing of consumption vis-à-vis current income through asset
accumulation or decumulation. We refer to this channel as the accumulation
or consumption smoothing channel.
Following Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha, we gauge the role of the capital
income ow channel by the comovement of international net factor income
ows given by the wedge between GDP and GNP with home GDP uc-
tuations. This suggests a panel regression
gdpkt   gnpkt = LRK gdpkt + ukt (4)
where gdp and gnp denote the idiosyncratic relative component of the
logarithm of GDP (output) and GNP (income) in country k, i.e. gdpk =
log(GDP k=GDP ) = ykt   yt and gnpk = log(GNP k=GNP ) = inckt   inct .
Again, the superscript LR is meant to distinguish the coe¢ cient of this
level regression from the one obtained from the analogous regressions in rst
di¤erences.
We measure the contribution of the second channel by the comovement
of saving or dissaving with GDP, i.e. we run regressions
gnpkt   conskt = LRC conskt + kt (5)
where in analogy to the above, consk = log(Ck=C) = ckt   ct denotes log
relative consumption.
Note that by construction, the uninsured component of output risk is
given by
LRu = 1  LRK   LRC
where Lu is the coe¢ cient of the panel version of the level risk sharing re-
gression dened by (3) above and which for convenience we reproduce here
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using the more compact notation:
conskt = 
LR
u gdp
k
t + v
k
t (6)
We estimate the three equations (4), (5), and (6) by weighted panel OLS.
To account for heteroskedasticity, we rst run the above regressions country
by country. We then weight all variables in the second-stage panel OLS
regression by the standard deviation of the country-specic residual.
Estimation of the level regressions may, however, raise an additional issue
because unlike relative growth rates of consumption, income and output,
relative levels may contain unit roots. But we note that even in the presence
of unit roots, the level risk sharing regressions (4)-(6) constitute long-run
panel relations in the sense of Phillips and Moon (1999) and can, in principle,
be estimated consistently by OLS. Since OLS may su¤er from second-order
bias due to potential simultaneity and serial correlation of the errors, we also
experimented with a Panel Dynamic OLS estimator. Mark and Sul (2003)
have forcefully argued for the use of this estimator not only on grounds of
its simplicity but also because unlike alternative methods such as Phillips
and Moons (1999) panel version of the fully modied OLS estimator  it
is well-suited for relatively small samples. The use of the Panel Dynamic
OLS-estimator yielded very similar results for all our specications. In the
remainder of the paper, we therefore only report results obtained from plain
panel OLS estimations.
Another important issue in estimating the above risk sharing regressions
concerns the treatment of country-specic xed e¤ects. As argued in SWYZ,
panel regressions in which country-specic e¤ects are not controlled for can
be thought of as capturing some notion of long-run risk sharing. In our set-
ting, the level specication already is meant to capture long-run risk sharing.
Still, as we argue in Artis and Ho¤mann (2006), where we discuss this is-
sue in considerable detail, the very notion of home bias implies that country
portfolios are heterogeneous. For example, relative changes in asset prices
can only a¤ect a countrys wealth in an asymmetric way if the size or compo-
sition of the countrys portfolio is di¤erent from that of other countries. We
think that this kind of heterogeneity is clearly interesting from a risk sharing
perspective and should therefore not be removed up-front. We therefore re-
port results that are based on regressions in which no control for xed e¤ects
has been included.
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the three level risk sharing
regressions (4), (5), and (6) for the two subperiods 1980-90 and 1990-2004.
The rst important observation is that risk sharing has indeed increased,
in line with what we nd from the time-slice regressions in the previous
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section. EU countries and countries that later, in the 1990s, were to become
EMU countries already in the 1980s shared more risk among themselves
than the OECD average. Also the increase in risk sharing in Europe seems
larger than for the OECD average, notably among EMU members. Note also
that the group of future EMU countries started out from (slightly) less risk
sharing than the EU 15 average in the 1980s but ended up sharing slightly
(but signicantly) more risk during the 1990-2004 period. This suggests that
EMU membership in itself and the associated elimination of exchange rate
risk along with the emergence of a common monetary policy may in itself
have led to better risk sharing an issue to which we return below.
It is important to put the increase in international risk sharing reected by
our estimates of LRu into perspective. This increase in risk sharing is not only
statistically signicant, it is economically very important: the memorandum
item in table (2) shows that even in the U.S. roughly 50 percent of long-
run idiosyncratic risk remains uninsured. So, if we depart from a world
of complete risk sharing and consider instead the empirically much more
relevant benchmark of a nancially highly integrated economy such as the
U.S., then the full extent of the increase in international risk sharing and in
particular of intra-European risk sharing can be appreciated. Starting from
an estimate of LRU of more than 0.95 in the 80s and going to 0.75-0.78 as in
the OECD case then implies that vis-à-vis a realistic benchmark such as the
federal states of the U.S. at least a third, if not half of the previous lack of
international risk sharinghas vanished within a single decade. This increase
in risk sharing is even more impressive among the European countries in the
sample: starting from around 0.85, these countries get stuck with just about
60 percent of their idiosyncratic risk in the 1990-2004 period, implying that
almost two third of the risk sharing gap vis-à-vis the U.S. has closed.
But while there is a clear increase in risk sharing, there seem to remain
major di¤erences in the way in which risk is shared at the international and
at the regional levels. At the bottom of the table, we reproduce estimates of
long run risk sharing for the U.S. obtained by Becker and Ho¤mann (2006).
Comparing our international estimates to these numbers reveals that at the
international level, all of the increase in risk sharing seems to come through
asset accumulation and decumulation, whereas in the U.S. most of the (long-
run) risk sharing seems to be happening through capital income ows.
As widely documented in the literature, the second half of the 1990s
has seen tremendous growth in portfolio gross holdings, so, even though the
sample period 1990-2000 is relatively short, the panel estimate could mask
important changes in the relative role of the channels for risk-sharing that
might have occurred in the more recent past. In particular, the advent of
European monetary union and the elimination of exchange rate risk are likely
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to have substantially a¤ected the portfolio choice of European investors and
may therefore also have changed the pattern of risk sharing.
In gure (2), we investigate this issue, by presenting the estimates of time
slice decompositions of the two channels into sequences fLRK g and fLRC g
along the lines of our earlier decompositions of LRu in gure (1). Table (2)
seems to suggest that the main di¤erence between OECD countries and EMU
or EU countries lies in how much risk they share, not so much in how they
share it. However, the graphs in gure (2) suggest that the time-average
emphasized by our panel regressions does indeed hide as of yet subtle but
increasingly important di¤erences in the pattern of risk sharing that have
started to emerge in the 1990s: In both the EU and EMU countries, capital
income ows, starting from a very low (actually rather large negative) contri-
bution to risk sharing in the 1980s, have grown to help smooth roundabout
ten percent of idiosyncratic output level risk in 2004. Given that 60 percent
of this risk remained uninsured at the end of the 1990s, this implies that
one quarter of the total risk sharing achieved between E(M)U countries is
achieved through capital income ows. In fact, for the E(M)U, much of the
growth in total consumption risk sharing in the most recent period seems to
have been driven by the growth in capital income ows. For all three coun-
try groups, the accumulation/consumption smoothing channel has grown in
importance but the curve described by LRC (t) seems to have attened out
somewhat in the second half of the 1990s whereas for the EU and EMU
countries, the rise in income ows only really starts after 1995.
Certainly, income smoothing through capital income ows has also in-
creased on average in the OECD as a whole. But, rst,the growth in LRK (t)
is much more subdued by the end of the sample period CK(t) barely ex-
ceeds 6 pecent  so that improvements in risk sharing seem to be driven
mainly by a larger contribution of the asset accumulation channel. And sec-
ondly, (results not reported) we do not nd any growth in the role of income
smoothing over the 1980-2004 period, if we drop the EU or EMU countries
from the OECD panel, which suggests that any growth in income ows we see
in the larger group of OECD countries is ultimately driven by larger capital
income ows among European countries.
4.1 Determinants of the pattern of risk sharing
We assess to what extent the rise in the contribution of capital income ows
to risk sharing between EU and EMU countries is driven by country portfolio
characteristics. Recent research (SWYZ) has started to document that the
increase in international risk sharing can be associated with the decline in
international portfolio home bias. In our own earlier work (Artis and Ho¤-
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mann (2006)), we show that portfolio heterogeneity matters for the way in
which risk is shared among countries. To the extent that EU countries hold
di¤erent portfolios than other economies, this could possibly explain why
the patterns of risk sharing di¤er between E(M)U and non-EU industrialised
countries.
To assess this issue, we extend SWYZs and our own work by parameter-
izing the risk sharing coe¢ cients LRK , 
LR
C , and 
LR
U as a function of both
country portfolio characteristics and a time trend, so that
kX(t) = X + 
0
X(zk   z)(t  t0)
where X = K;C;U , X denotes average risk sharing through channel X,
zk is a vector of country characteristics and z the vector of cross-country
means of zk.5 While we use period averages of country characteristics, so
that zk is not time-varying, we allow for time dynamics in 
k
X by interacting
the country-characteristics with a deterministic trend term. In this way, we
essentially proxy for a country-specic time trend in kX . Plugging the above
relation into (4) (6) we then obtain a panel regression in which the elements
of (t   t0)(zk   z) are interacted with gdpkt and from which the coe¢ cient
vector X can be estimated.
Our vector of country characteristics zk includes two separate measures
of international asset cross-holdings: the rst, that we abbreviate as cat is a
measure of country ks cumulative asset trade relative to its total nancial
wealth. The second, called eqshare is the share of equity in cumulative asset
trade.6 To assess the role of EMU membership on the extent and the pattern
of risk sharing, we use an EMU membership dummy. Finally, we also include
a pure time trend to capture the common time trend in risk sharing that is
we can think of as being driven by time variation in the cross-sectional mean
z and by other un-modelled common characteristics. This implies that we
have
zk =

1 catk   cat eqsharek   eqshare EMUk   EMU
0
To focus on recent developments, we present our results for the period
since the start of EMU, i.e. for 1999-2004. Table (3) summarizes our ndings.
5Since in this part of the paper we are only dealing with level regressions, we simplify
notation by dropping the superscript LR.
6Specically, we construct cat as gross foreign assets relative to GDP, i.e. catk = Ak+LkYk
and cumulative equity trade as ceqtk =
Aeqk +L
eq
k
Yk
, where Ak and Lk are total gross foreign
assets and gross liabilities respectively and Aeqk and L
eq
k are gross foreign equity assets
and liabilities. The equity share is then eqsharek = ceqtk=catk. Our data are based on
Philip Lanes and Gianmaria Milesi-Ferrettis (2006) recently updated External Wealth of
Nations data set.
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For aggregate risk sharing, the results are very intuitive and conrm some
of the earlier ndings by SWYZ and ourselves: most importantly, countries
with more asset trade (higher cat) share signicantly more risk overall. The
uninteracted part of the aggregate time trend tends to decrease risk sharing
over the period, though. This could reect the decline in world stock markets
over that period that lowered the value of nancial relative to real assets such
as human capital and housing. It is possible that this relative increase in the
value of virtually non-diversiable assets could have resulted in a temporary
decrease in aggregate risk sharing. Such an interpretation would also tie in
with our nding that countries with relatively more equity trade share signif-
icantly less risk, an otherwise somewhat surprising result. Possibly, however,
this e¤ect could also be explained by the correlation between equity shares in
country portfolios and the cumulated asset trade, which may make it some-
what di¢ cult to isolate the e¤ects of eqshare and cat.7 EMU-membership
per se as a point estimate is positive which would suggest that EMU mem-
bership lowers risk sharing relative to the rest of the country group. However,
this result is barely signicant.
To our knowledge, results for the way in which portfolio characteristics
a¤ect the role of the individual channels of risk-sharing have not been re-
ported in the literature. We nd that the common time trend is negative
for both capital income ows and asset accumulation/decumulation, in line
with our previous result that there was a downward trendon risk sharing
during this short sample period. The EMU dummy has a strongly positive
e¤ect on the contribution of capital income ows and a negative one on asset
accumulation/decumulation. These two e¤ects seem to cancel out, the net
e¤ect, as discussed previously, would barely seem signicant. This reconrms
our point - already apparent from the earlier graphical results, that by the
end of the 1990s EMU membership matters maybe less for how much risk
an industrialised country shares but increasingly for how this risk sharing is
accomplished.
Finally, by way of comparison, the lower panel of table (3) also gives the
estimates of LRX for the period 1999-2004 obtained from a level risk sharing
regression without interaction e¤ects. These coe¢ cients are very much in
line with the estimates of X reported in the rst line of the table. This fact,
together with the substantial improvement in R2 that we obtain through
the interaction terms on the two channel regressions, i.e. for LRK and 
LR
C ,
suggests that the three country characteristics we consider here cumulative
7Note that the size of the coe¢ cient on eqshare is owed to the fact that eqshare is the
percentage point deviation from the mean, whereas the other variables are measured in
absolute deviations from their respective cross-sectional means.
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asset trade, the role of equity trade in international asset cross-holdings and
EMU membership do a reasonably good job in explaining country-specic
trends in the patterns of international risk sharing since the inception of
EMU.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
International risk sharing has increased in the 1990s. This paper has shown
that this increase is economically important and even more so in Europe than
elsewhere. We have reported empirical ndings to support the notion that
intra-European risk sharing increasingly approximates the pattern observed
in the U.S. or more generally within countries; this is true maybe not so
much for the actual extent of risk sharing here there is still some way to
go, even though one third to one half of the lack of international risk sharing
seems to have vanished within a decade if the U.S. is taken as a benchmark 
but rather in the way in which risk gets shared, namely through more capital
income ows due to ex ante swaps of equity.
It is interesting to link these ndings to the more traditional approach of
testing for long-run capital mobility between countries. A lot of this literature
has built on Feldstein and Horioka (1980) by examining savings-investment
correlations. In a recent study of European countries, Blanchard and Gi-
avazzi (2002) document that savings-investment correlations have decreased
in Europe and especially in the Euro area. Our ndings here complement
this result from the perspective of the macroeconomic risk sharing literature:
in particular, the rise of risk sharing through capital income ows is not only
consistent with, but is ultimately a necessity, for the patterns in savings-
investment correlations documented by Blanchard and Giavazzi to prevail.
In the long-run for a country to decouple its savings from its investment
will only be possible if the persistent current account imbalance is nanced
through non-zero net capital income ows.
While it is too early to tell what is at the source of this development, one
plausible candidate is the elimination of exchange rate risk within the EU
and among EMU countries in particular. The recent literature has empha-
sized the role of valuation e¤ects for the size of international asset positions.
As we have argued in our own recent work, portfolio heterogeneity is a pre-
condition for such valuation e¤ects to have an e¤ect (either a stabilizing or
destabilizing one) and we have shown that substantial international port-
folio heterogeneity is required to explain why  at least at business cycle
horizons international income ows have remained relatively muted as in-
ternational risk sharing has increased (Artis and Ho¤mann (2006)). As we
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know from recent research on global imbalances (most prominently Gourin-
chas and Rey (2006)), valuation e¤ects also work mainly through exchange
rate adjustments. As argued in Hau and Rey (2006), such valuation e¤ects
can in themselves lead to frequent portfolio rebalancing if exchange rate risk
cannot be fully diversied. The result is high turnover in equity markets:
instead of holding foreign equity positions in order to reap dividend ows,
investors rebalance their portfolio, by realizing foreign capital gains. For
macroeconomic risk sharing that should imply, that risk sharing takes place
rather through cumulation and decumulation of assets rather than through
capital income ows. However, to the extent that exchange rate variability
gets eliminated, countries may then hold more homogeneous portfolios with
less turnover so that risk sharing may take place rather through income ows
than through continual sale and purchase of assets. The result should be a
pattern of risk sharing as we see it within countries: lots of capital income
ows. Possibly, what we start to see in European data is the reection of
these fundamental changes.
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Table 1: Basic risk sharing regressions
(ckt  ct ) = const+ u(ykt  yt ) + ukt
OLS
1980-90 1990-2004
OECD 23 0.83 (15.72) 0.64 (17.19)
EU 15 0.66 (9.56) 0.62 (14.63)
EMU 12 0.55 (7.14) 0.58 (13.33)
Weighted Least Squares
1980-90 1990-2000
OECD 23 0.80 (16.82) 0.68 (19.70)
EU15 0.66 (12.11) 0.65 (17.05)
EMU 12 0.61 (9.62) 0.63 (14.25)
NOTES:Upper panel: OLS estimates, lower panel Weighted least squares: In
a rst stage, the risk sharing regression was run country-by-country. The country-
specic residual variance is then used to weight the data in the second-stage panel
regression. t-values in parentheses.
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Table 2: Channels of long-run risk sharing
xt = const+ Xgdp
k
t + u
k
t
1980-90 1990-2004
OECD 23 LRK -0.05 (-9.55) 0.0168 (4.16)
LRC 0.05 (2.78) 0.1980 (13.54)
LRU 0.99 (58.64) 0.7852 (49.32)
EU 15 LRK -0.06 (-7.10) 0.0396 (9.71)
LRC 0.22 (18.61) 0.3540 (46.47)
LRU 0.84 (59.33) 0.6064 (64.77)
EMU 12 LRK -0.07 (-7.99) 0.05 (11.77)
LRC 0.18 (14.09) 0.37 (52.01)
LRU 0.89 (60.42) 0.58 (63.55)
Memorandum item (source: Becker and Ho¤mann (2006))
Regression-based VAR-based
LRK 0.67 0.48
USA LRC -0.16 0.08
LRU 0.51 0.44
NOTES: The table reports estimates of the long-run (level) risk sharing re-
gressions for the capital income ow (x = gdp   gnp;X = K) and the asset
cumulation and decumulation (x = gnp   cons, X = C) channels as well as for
the unsmoothed component (x = cons;X = U). The regressions were performed
as a two-stage weighted least squares procedure along the lines described in table
1. t-values in parentheses.The memorandum item contains a regression-based and
a VAR-based estimate (at a 30-year forecasting horizon) of the long-run risk shar-
ing channels for the U.S., 1963-90, taken from table 1, p. 791 and table 2, p. 793
in Becker and Ho¤mann (2006).
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Table 3
Determinants of the pattern of risk sharing 1999-2004
OECD-23 countries
I II III
Income Smoothing Cons. Smoothing Uninsured
X -0.007 0.30 0.71
(-0.20) (3.55) (8.03)
t  t0 -0.04 -0.03 0.07
(-2.97) (-0.99) (2.0824)
catk(t  t0) 0.005 0.02 -0.02
(1.88) (2.67) (-3.29)
eqsharek(t  t0) 0.03 -0.77 0.74
(0.50) (-5.27) (4.90)
EMUk(t  t0) 0.04 -0.12 0.08
(2.57) (-2.93) (1.86)
R2 0.20 0.34 0.73
Memorandum item: level regression without IA-term, 1999-2004
LRX 0.0338 0.2518 0.7144
(2.0790) (6.1169) (16.6422)
R2 0.03 0.22 0.67
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Figure 1: Cross-sectional risk sharing regressions 1980-2000
a) Di¤erences b) Levels
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Figure 2: Cross-sectional level risk sharing regressions 1980-2000
Capital income ows Asset cumulation /decumulation
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